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«t ;* :. . : > v Answer whici genera. i t:i * -^  denied 
the requests made by the wife relative to custody, child support, 
alimony and property distribution as being unreasonable and 
requesting that certain premarital property and gifts from his 
parents be restored to him should a divorce be granted. 
This appeal involves the trial court's award of alimony, the 
trial court's failure to award to the husbaand what was left of 
his premarital property, the trial court's inclusion in the marital 
estate of specific gifts made to the husband only by his parents 
and the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the wife. 
The case was tried before the Honorable John A. Rokich on 
January 12, 13, 17 & 18 and February 7, 1989. The Court received 
certain stipulations of the parties, testimony and documentary 
evidence. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the 
matter under advisement and on March 6, 1989, issued a Memorandum 
Decision. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce were prepared by the wife's counsel and objections to the 
same were filed by the husband's trial counsel. Those objections 
were argued to the trial court on April 18, 1989. Certain 
modifications in the proposed Findings were made and on April 26, 
1989, and final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce were signed and entered on April 26, 1989 (copies of the 
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce have been included in the Addendum to this 
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he is awarded what was Lett' of his premarital property ai the time 
of trial. 
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3. For an Order modifying the property distribution so that 
he is given credit for the substantial cash gifts and advances on 
his inheritance given to him by his parents during the marriage. 
4. For an Order reversing and vacating the trial court's 
award of attorney's fees to the wife. 
5. For an order awarding him his costs on Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Marital History 
The parties were married on June 27, 1981, (R. 2). They 
separated in approximately March of 1988 (R. 9) . At the time of 
trial, the wife, Elizabeth was 3 0 years old and the husband, David 
was 36. During the marriage, they had three children, ages 3, 4 
& 6, respectively (Tr. 7) . Neither had been married before and 
neither had any other support obligations. Elizabeth had secured 
a bachelors of science degree in business administration and had 
completed 44 hours toward a masters of divinity degree at 
Southwestern Theological Seminary in Ft. Worth, Texas (Tr. 8) . 
David had received a bachelors degree in business at the University 
of Tennessee and a masters degree of divinity at Southwestern 
Theological Seminary in Ft. Worth, Texas (Tr. 53). 
Elizabeth brought nothing into the marriage, however, prior 
to the marriage, David had received a cash gift from his parents 
in the amount of $37,500.00 cash which he had placed in a Merrill 
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Lynch Ready Asset Account also established prior to the marriage 
(Tr. 629). At the time of the marriage, David's parents gave the 
parties $8,000.00 cash as a wedding gift (Tr. 761). The parties, 
because of religious convictions, agreed to take $5,000.00 of that 
sum and contribute it as a tithe (Tr. 761) . The remaining 
$3,000.00 was evidently used for family expenses during the first 
few years of the marriage and was deposited into David's Ready 
Asset Account. In August of 1985, the parties moved to Salt 
Lake City, where David began to work part-time for the Granite 
School District Transportation Department as a bus driver. He also 
acquired a part-time job with the State of Utah as a Protestant 
Chaplain at the Utah State Prison (Tr. 613). 
After moving to Salt Lake City, the parties decided to 
purchase a home which continued to be the marital residence up 
through the time of trial. The home was purchased for $55,411.80 
(R. 86) . At trial, it was agreed that the fair market value of the 
home according to the most recent tax assessment was $54,850.00 
(Tr. 634) and at that time, there was an outstanding balance owed 
on the first trust deed of $26,161.32 (Tr. 635). The home was 
purchased as a result of a $20,000.00 cash gift given to David in 
the form of a check and a $7,000.00 loan also given in the form of 
a check both of which were from David's parent's (Tr. 713). The 
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$20,000.00 was considered by David to be an advance towards his 
inheritance (Tr. 713). In addition, in 1987 the parties purchased 
a Blazer automobile for $21,166.29 (Tr. 626). In connection with 
that purchase, they traded in a car previously given to them from 
David's parents. It had a trade-in value of $3,635.3 6 (Exhibits 
20D & 21D). David's parents then gave David a check for $13,500.00 
which represented the cash down payment on that automobile (Tr. 
626, 627, 628). The remaining $4,900.00 was financed and the 
parties, at the time of trial, were paying that obligation off at 
the rate of $99.00 per month (R. 85). 
The $20,000.00 inheritance and the $13,500.00 down payment on 
the automobile were gifts from David's parents to David (Tr. 62 8, 
636). David's parents intended those gifts for David only, not 
Elizabeth (R. 13-17). 
While in Salt Lake, the parties decided to establish a 
ministry within their home and began to build a small congregation. 
In order to assist the parties in this venture, each of the 
parties' parents began contributing monthly sums to the ministry. 
Elizabeth's parents gave approximately $350.00 per month (Tr. 52) 
and David's parents gave approximately $150.00 per month and in 
addition, contributed approximately $1,000.00 per year toward 
purchase of the children's clothing. The monthly contributions of 
the parties' parents went to the operation of the ministry to cover 
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expenses related to serving the congregation and maintaining the 
ministry (Tr. 52-53, 744). Evidently, both sets of parents were 
claiming such monthly contributions as charitable contributions for 
tax purposes (Tr. 743). 
Elizabeth stated that prior to trial she had been employed 
with Transamerica Telemarketing and worked about 3 0 hours per week. 
She indicated that during that time she had broken the office 
record in sales, but she had recently terminated that employment 
by her own choice on the grounds that she "had burned out" after 
three months on the job (Tr. 47). At the time of trial, Elizabeth 
was employed at Fred Meyer working 25-3 0 hours per week with a 
gross income of $450.00 per month ($4.10 per hour) (Tr. 48). She 
also admitted that she knew how to type, run computers, and had 
secretarial skills (Tr. 50) and following to trial, but prior to 
the trial court's entry of its Memorandum Decision, the court was 
advised that Elizabeth had obtained full-time employment as a 
receptionist with a local law firm at the rate of $6.00 per hour 
or $960.00 per month (R. 141). 
At the time of trial, David had been employed in his jobs with 
the Granite School District and the State of Utah for three and 
one-half years (Tr. 613). His gross income from his chaplain 
services at the prison was approximately $700.00 per month and his 
gross income from the Granite School District was approximately 
7 
$860.00 per month; resulting in a total monthly gross income of 
$1,567.00 per month (Tr. 613). In addition, he had historically 
earned approximately $2,000.00 per year ($166.67 per month) as a 
directors fee from his father's company. He was working 49 hours 
per week in connection with the two jobs (Tr. 73 2) and after 
including the $166.67 per month described above, David netted after 
taxes approximately $1,400.00 (Tr. 616 and Exhibit 18-D). In 1988, 
his total gross income was $20,965.00 (Tr. 728). 
During the marriage, David kept his premarital Merrill Lynch 
Ready Asset Account separate and at no time placed Elizabeth's name 
on the account, nor at any time did she have access to it. The 
only funds which were deposited into the account during the 
marriage was the remaining $3,000.00 of the $8,000.00 wedding gift 
given the parties by David's parents (Tr. 741, 762). The Merrill 
Lynch Ready Asset Account was not changed, altered and was 
continuously maintained by David from prior to the marriage to the 
date of trial. During the marriage, David elected to open an IRA 
account in his name and on occasion would withdraw funds from the 
Ready Asset Account to make an annual IRA contribution for him. 
At the time of trial, there was $1,994.59 remaining in the Merrill 
Lynch Ready Asset Account (Tr. 629) and $13,069.77 in David's IRA 
account (Tr. 799-800). Elizabeth admitted that $37,500.00 of the 
funds originally in the Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account were 
8 
David's premarital property (Tr. 820). 
After separation, Elizabeth obtained a temporary restraining 
order against David (R. 7) which ultimately resulted in a temporary 
order requiring David to vacate the marital residence and to pay 
to Elizabeth $100.00 per month, per child in child support and the 
$354.00 per month house payment (R. 46-49). Thereafter, numerous 
motions on temporary issues were filed, argued and ruled upon by 
the Domestic Relations Commissioner and/or the trial court. The 
case was ultimately tried before Judge Rokich on January 12, 13, 
17, 18 and February 7, 1989. 
Trial Proceedings 
The record in this case is voluminous due in large part to the 
fact that each party strenuously asseted their rights to custody 
over their children. Substantial portions of the record deal with 
that custody issue. At the conclusion of what appears to be a very 
unorthodox and disjointed trial proceeding, the trial court filed 
a Memorandum Decision which in relevant part provided as follows: 
1. It awarded custody of the parties1 three minor children 
to Elizabeth subject to substantially enlarged and liberal 
visitation and parental access for David (R. 178-180); 
2. It awarded Elizabeth the use and possession of the 
marital residence subject to a lien in David's favor of $13,900 
(one-half of the present net equity without considering the 
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$27,000,00 contributed toward the purchase price by David's parents 
(R. 181); 
3. It awarded David the 1987 Blazer automobile subject to 
him paying Elizabeth $6,500.00 representing one-half of the equity 
in that vehicle again without considering the $13,500.00 gift to 
David from his parents (R. 181); 
4. It directed David to pay child support in accordance with 
child support guidelines without finding incomes, imputing income 
or ordering an exact amount by way of child support (R. 182); (The 
figure of $354.00 per month later found its way into the Findings 
(R. 254). 
5. It awarded Elizabeth the Decree of Divorce (R. 182); 
6. It awarded Elizabeth $2 50.00 per month permanent alimony 
from David without making a finding as to Elizabeth's ability to 
support herself; 
7. It required David to pay $5,000.00 toward Elizabeth's 
attorney's fees (R. 182); 
8. It then directed Elizabeth's counsel to prepare findings 
consistent with the Memorandum Decision (R. 182). 
Thereafter, proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce were prepared and David's counsel filed 
objections to the same (R. 186-193) . The objections of David were 
presented to the Court at a hearing on April 18, 1989 (R. 856-876) . 
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Subsequent to that hearing, certain modifications were made in the 
Findings, Conclusions and Decree and final Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were signed on April 26, 
1989 (R. 260, 261). 
On May 24, 1989, David filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R. 
325). Elizabeth did not file a Cross-Appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court erred in awarding permanent alimony to the 
Elizabeth. The evidence presented to the trial court reflected a 
relatively short marriage, a young husband and wife, healthy, with 
approximately equal education and equal earning capacities had not 
the wife voluntarily underemployed herself. As such, an award of 
alimony was inappropriate. In making this award, the trial court 
erroneously attempted to maintain the wife's standard of living 
without considering that the alimony award would have the effect 
of greatly reducing the husband's standard of living when both 
claimed approximately the same amount of monthly expenses. In 
addition, the trial court's Findings relative to the alimony award 
were fatally defective in that they did not address the wife's 
ability to support herself or provide the necessary financial facts 
to support the alimony award. The alimony award should be vacated 
in its entirety. 
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POINT II 
Prior to the marriage, David had $37,500.00 in Merrill Lynch 
Ready Asset Account in his sole name representing a gift to him 
from his parents prior to the marriage. That account was kept 
separate during the entire marriage and Elizabeth was given no 
interest in or access to the same. During the marriage, David 
withdrew certain sums annually to contribute to an IRA in his name. 
The record contains no evidence as to how the remaining funds were 
used, but at the time of trial there was only $1,994.59 left in the 
Ready Asset Account and $13,069.77 in the IRA account. Throughout 
the marriage, these funds were kept separate and distinct from 
marital funds and Elizabeth had no control whatsoever over the 
same. The trial court erroneously concluded that both of these 
accounts were marital property and divided them equally between 
the parties. To do so was contrary to the holdings of Mortensen 
v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988) and Jesperson v. Jesperson, 
610 P. 2d 326 (Utah 1980) which stand for the proposition that 
separate, gifted or inherited property should be returned to the 
party who received such property. In so doing, the trial court 
created marital property where marital property did not exist and 
arrived at an unfair and inequitable property distribution 
unjustifiably in favor of Elizabeth and unjustifiably unfair to 
David. The trial court's property distribution should be vacated 
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as it relates to the IRA and Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Accounts 
and those should be awarded to David as his sole and separate 
premarital property. 
POINT III 
During the course of the marriage, David's parents gave David 
$20,000,00 as an advance on his inheritance which he used as part 
of the down payment on the marital residence, and loaned him an 
additional $7,000.00 which he likewise used as a part of the down 
payment. They also gave him $13,500.00 case to purchase a car 
consistent with the practices they had engaged in with the rest of 
their children. The evidence presented to the trial court 
reflected that these were gifts to David only and not David and 
Elizabeth jointly. In spite of this evidence, the trail court 
erroneously chose to ignore the gifts and give David no credit for 
the same. In addition, the trial court found that the $7,000.00 
loan from David's parents was only a moral obligation and 
disregarded it entirely. In so doing, the trial court again 
ignored the evidence before it and did not follow the rule laid 
down in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), that 
portion of the Decree that gives David no credit for the gifts he 
received from his parents should be vacated and the matter remanded 
with instructions to the trial court to increase David's lien in 
the marital residence to the extent of any such gifts. 
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POINT IV 
Under Utah law, the party requesting an award of attorney's 
fees has the burden of proving three elements: (1) the 
reasonableness of the fee; (2) the need of that party to have his 
or her fee paid or contributed to; and (3) the ability of the party 
from whom the fee is being requested to contribute to or pay an 
attorney's fee award. In this case, while the first two elements 
may have been present in terms of evidence in the record, the third 
was not satisfied. The trial court erroneously required David to 
contribute $5,000.00 toward Elizabeth's attorney's fees when David 
had not the income nor the property to look to in order to satisfy 
such a fee award. As such, the trial court's attorney's fee award 
of $5,000.00 should be reversed and vacated in its entirety with 
an order requiring each party to bear their own fees and costs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARDED OF ALIMONY 
TO THE WIFE IN TERMS OF AMOUNT AND DURATION 
WHEN CONSIDERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CHILD 
SUPPORT ORDERED AND THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE 
INCOMES AND ABILITIES TO SUPPORT THEMSELVES 
14 
lb. 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO EQUALIZE THE 
STANDARD OF LIVING OF BOTH PARTIES IN 
MAKING ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY 
This is a case in which the trial court should not have 
awarded the alimony it did. The facts as reflected by the evidence 
did not justify the award. 
This was a seven and one-half year marriage (R. 2). At the 
time of trial, Elizabeth was 3 0 years old and David was 3 6 (Tr. 7) . 
Both had bachelors degrees in business administration (Tr. 8, 53) 
and while David had a Masters in divinity (Tr. 53), Elizabeth had 
44 hours towards her Masters in divinity (Tr. 8). There was no 
evidence that either was not in good health. Elizabeth had good 
and proficient secretarial and computer skills as well as her 
education and training in business (Tr. 50) . In spite of this, at 
the time of trial, she voluntarily chose to work part-time at Fred 
Meyer as a clerk 25-30 hours per week at $4.10 per hour which 
equated to $450.00 per month gross (Tr. 50). Just after 
separation, she had had a job at Transamerica Telemarketing as a 
sales representative (Tr. 47) . She held the job at for about three 
months during which time she broke the office record in sales (Tr. 
47). She then, however, voluntarily terminated that job to take 
the clerking job at Fred Meyer because she said she was "burned 
out" (Tr. 47) . This change of jobs and reduction in work time 
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occurred while this action was pending. After trial, but before 
the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision, the court was 
advised by letter from Elizabeth's counsel that she had obtained 
a full-time job as a receptionist and was earning $960.00 gross per 
month (R. 141). 
David on the other hand was working two jobs (Tr. 59) and 
putting in 49 hours per week (Tr. 734). He grossed $700.00 per 
month from his chaplain's job at the state prison and $860.00 per 
month driving school buses. In addition, he earned $166.00 per 
month as a director's fee from his father's company (Tr. 614). 
Elizabeth testified he had not had any offers to work as a full-
time minister during the marriage (Tr. 60) . 
Elizabeth testified she had expenses of $2,100.00 per month 
as reflected on an earlier Financial Declaration, but which was 
never received into evidence (Tr. 63) (See Exhibit list, Addendum 
to this Brief) . In rebutting that testimony, David had gone 
through the total family expenditures for 198 7 and calculated that 
while living together they were spending approximately $1,100.00 
per month (Tr. 644, 646 and Ex. 3D & 24D) . David, on the other 
hand, testified from his Financial Declaration which was admitted 
into evidence that his monthly expenses including a $3 00.00 per 
month child support award were $1,801.33 (Tr. 619, R. 86, Ex. 18-
D). 
16 
With this evidence before it, the trial court ordered that 
David pay the following monthly payments: 
1. $250.00 per month in permanent alimony (R. 260) 
2. $354.00 per month in child support (R. 265) 
3. $211.25 per month in child care (R. 266) 
Total $815.25 
In making an award of alimony, trial courts in Utah are duty 
bound to consider the financial condition and needs of the spouse 
requesting alimony, the ability of that spouse to produce 
sufficient income for herself or himself and the ability of the 
paying spouse to provide support to the requesting spouse. (Olson 
v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 
276 (Utah 1987); Jones v. Jones 700 P. 2d 1072 (Utah 1985); Canning 
v. Canning, 744 P.2d 325 (Utah App. 1987); and Schindler v. 
Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989). 
Once the court has considered the evidence related to these 
criteria, it must then attempt to adjust the parties1 finances to 
arrive at support figures which achieve as closely as possible an 
equalization of the standards of living of both parties and then 
as a secondary consideration, attempt to maintain each of them at 
a level as close as possible to the standard of living they enjoyed 
while married. 
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As was stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Olson v. Olson, 704 
P.2d 564 (Utah 1985): 
An alimony award should, as far as 
possible, equalize the parties' respective 
standards of living and maintain them at a 
level as close as possible to the standard of 
living enjoyed during the marriage. 
Id. at 566 [Emphasis added] 
See also Higlev v. Higlev. 676, Pe2d 379 (Utah 1983). 
In the present case, the trial court erred by not considering 
the substantial decrease in David's standard of living which 
accured by virtue of the overall support award vis a vis the total 
income of the parties as the following clearly reflects: 
David Elizabeth 
Net Monthly Income $1,^0.00 $ 787.00 $960 gross less 
Child support est. 18% taxes 
(354.00) 354.00 
Alimony (250.00) 250.00 
Child Care 
Contribution (211.25) 211.25 
Disposable Income $ 584.75 $1,602.25 
This substantial difference in disposable income becomes even 
more inequitable when considered in conjunction with the liberal 
visitation schedule which the trial court awarded David. Under 
that schedule, David will have the children almost as much as 
Elizabeth and will have many of the same expenses related to them 
that she has but will have no monies to meet those expenses. 
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Therefore, the only way to achieve an equitable allocation of 
income between the parties is to eliminate the alimony award so 
that each party can at least have similar standards of living. 
Even in so doing, there will still be a disparity in disposable 
income, but under the circumstances of this case, perhaps such a 
disparity is unavoidable. 
As was stated in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979): 
The purpose of alimony is to provide post 
marital support; it is intended neither as a 
penalty to be imposed on the husband nor as a 
reward granted to the wife. 
Id. at 147. 
The facts of this case including the ages and health of the 
parties, the relatively short term of the marriage, the parity of 
education between the parties, their respective incomes after 
considering his child support obligations, their similar earning 
capacities and Elizabeth's voluntary underemployment demonstrate 
that this was not a case where an alimony award, let alone a 
permanent alimony award, was appropriate. The award should be 
vacated in its entirety. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW ON THE ISSUE OF ALIMONY ARE 
INADEQUATE 
A trial court's decision will be overturned if its Findings 
of Fact are not sufficiently detailed as to all factors contained 
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in the statue for determination of support to be paid in divorce 
actions. Jeffries v. Jeffries, 752 P. 2d 909, 911 (Utah App. 1988). 
As was held in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P. 2d 121 
(Utah App. 1988): 
Moreover, it is reversible error if a 
trial court fails to make findings on all 
material issues unless the facts in the record 
are "'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment.1" Acton v. Deliran, 7373 P.2d 996 
(Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 
P.2d 233 (Utah 1983)). 
Utah courts have consistently found an 
abuse of discretion in setting alimony when the 
trail court failed to make findings on the 
financial conditions and needs of the receiving 
spouse. See e.g., Hialey v. Higley, 676 P.2d 
379, 382 (Utah 1983) (remanded since the trial 
court made no findings with regard to the 
receiving spouse's ability to work); Ruhsam v. 
Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 12, 126 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(trial court failed to adequately address the 
financial needs of the claimant spouse, making 
it necessary for the reviewing court to remand 
the issue for further findings). 
Id. 124 
In this case, the trial court's Memorandum Decision fails to 
recite any financial data whatsoever in support of its statements. 
. The defendant shall pay child 
support in accordance with the child support 
guidelines . . . 
The defendant shall pay $250.00 as alimony 
to the plaintiff. 
(R. 182) 
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Thereafter, Elizabeth submitted Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which were ultimately signed by the trial court 
after minor modifications; even those inadequately addressed the 
required elements. The trial court found in pertinent part as 
follows: 
17. The plaintiff was not employed 
outside the home during the marriage. The 
plaintiff was not employed outside the home at 
the time of the divorce. She obtained 
employment as a receptionist prior to the 
ruling entered herein. She is now earning 
$960.00 a month, gross. (R. 253) 
26. Based on the standard of living 
enjoyed by the parties during their marriage, 
the incomes of the parties, the needs of the 
plaintiff, and the defendant's ability to pay, 
it is reasonable, just, and equitable that the 
defendant should be ordered to pay alimony in 
the amount of $250.00 a month. Said alimony 
shall terminate upon the plaintiff's 
remarriage, cohabitation with a member of the 
opposite sex, or death (R. 254, 255). 
Conspicuously absent from these Findings is the required 
element of plaintiff's ability to provide support for herself and 
the absolutely critical underlying financial information relative 
to the living expenses of each of the parties. The absence of this 
information in the Findings make any award of alimony fatally 
defective and consequently this Court should reverse and vacate 
the alimony award. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING THE 
DEFENDANT WHAT WAS LEFT OF HIS PREMARITAL 
PROPERTY 
The law in Utah is now clear that pre-marital property and/or 
its proceeds should be awarded the to the party who brought the 
property into the marriage. In the recent case of Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), Justice Howe reaffirmed the 
principles related to premarital property in divorce actions and 
stated: 
. . . In Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 
(Utah 1982), we affirmed a divorce decree 
awarding to each party in general the real and 
personal property he or she brought into the 
marriage or inherited during the marriage^ We 
there said: 
following the principle we have approved 
in cases like Georgedes v. Georgedes, Utah 
627 P.2d 44 (Utah 1981); Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980); and 
Humphrey v. Humphreys, Utah 520 P.2d 193 
(197 4), the district court concluded that 
each party should in general receive the 
real and personal property he or she 
brought to the marriage or inherited 
during the marriage. 
Id. at 306 [Emphasis added] 
In the case of Jesperson v. Jesperson, our Supreme Court also 
upheld the trial court's division of the property on the same 
basis. The trial court found that the defendant brought no assets 
into the six-year marriage. The plaintiff on the other hand, 
22 
brought into the marriage a number of assets including $22,500.00 
in savings. The Supreme Court's affirmation of the Decree stated: 
It was not unreasonable for the court to permit 
the plaintiff to withdraw from the marital 
property the equivalent of those assets 
plaintiff brought into the marriage. 
Id. at 328 [Emphasis added] 
In this case, there are no circumstances allowing deviation 
from the general rule. In fact, the circumstances of this case 
require an application of the Mortensen rule. 
It is undisputed and was acknowledged by Elizabeth and her 
counsel that David came into the marriage with the Merrill Lynch 
Ready Asset Account in his name with a $37,500.00 balance 
representing gifts he received from his family. That account 
continued to remain in his own name and with the same institution 
throughout the marriage. At no time did Elizabeth have control of, 
access to, or any interest in that account. When the parties 
married, $3,000.00 of the $8,000.00 wedding gift from David's 
parents went into the account. At the time of tiral, this account 
had $1,999.59 in it. 
The evidence was also undisputed that during this relatively 
short marriage, David would on occasion withdraw funds from the 
Ready Asset Account and deposit them into an IRA for his benefit 
which fund had $13,000.00 in it at the time of trial. These 
transactions in no way changed the character or source of the 
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money, but only the vehicle in which the money was held. 
In sum, these monies which started out to be $4 0,500.00 before 
and at the time of the marriage resulted in two accounts totalling 
approximately $15,000.00 which the trial court then arbitrarily and 
without sufficient evidence elected to divide in half resulting in 
$7,500.00 going to David when seven years ago he had started out 
with $40,500.00 or a net $33,000.00 loss to him from funds given 
to him by his family. 
In dividing the funds remaining in his IRA and Ready Asset 
Account equally between the parties, the trial court ignored the 
law set out in Mortensen, Jesperson, Humphreys and Georqedes, 
supra. when it had no factual or legal basis to do so. Most 
likely, the trial court incorrectly analyzed the parties1 economic 
situation and concluded that since the parties had acquired very 
little by way of marital assets, the best thing to do was to divide 
David's separate, premarital, gifted, property equally. If any 
event the trial court did not follow the Law as it relates to 
awarding separate pre-marital property to the person bringing it 
into the marriage and consequently, that portion of the Decree 
relating to the Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account and David's IRA 
should be vacated and those two assets should be awarded to David 
in their entirety. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INCLUDING SPECIFIC 
GIFTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT'S PARENTS TO THE 
DEFENDANT AS A PART OF THE HARITAL ESTATE 
During the relatively short marriage, David's parents gave 
David substantial cash gifts and advances on his inheritance in 
addition to loaning him $7,000.00 in connection with the purchase 
of the parties1 home. 
As stated in Point II of this Brief, the law is well settled 
in Utah that gifted or inherited property received by a party 
during a marriage should generally be returned to the party to whom 
the gift was made, when that issue was raised in divorce 
proceedings. 
The trial court in this present case failed to follow the law 
in Utah as was recently set forth in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 7 60 
P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) where Justice Howe states: 
We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making 
"equitable" property division pursuant to 
section 30-3-5 should, in accordance with the 
rule prevailing in most other jurisdictions and 
with the division made in many of our own 
cases, generally award property acquired by one 
spouse by gift and inheritance during the 
marriage (or property acquired in exchanged 
thereof) to that spouse, together with any 
appreciation or enhance of its values unless 
(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts 
or expense contributed to the enhancement, 
maintenance, or protection of that property, 
. . . or (2) the property has been consumed or 
its identity lost through combining or 
exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has 




Likewise, in Preston v. Preston, 646 P. 2d 705, Utah 1982 
Justice Oaks again set forth the standard on gifted and inherited 
property in Utah and stated that to be marital property it has to 
be acquired during the marriage through the '"joint effort" of the 
parties. If there is an absence of such joint efforts, then the 
property should be treated as a separate and returned to the party 
who originally received it. 
In this case, the testimony was clear that the $2 0,000.00 cash 
used as part of the down payment on the marital residence was a 
gift to David only not David and Elizabeth (Tr. 636, R. 18-21) . 
Likewise, the car originally given David by his parents and 
subsequently used as a trade in on the Blazer and the $13,000.00 
cash gift to David from his parents was a gift to him consistent 
with their family practice of giving a car to each of the children 
(R. 18-21) Even Elizabeth said that this type of gift was made "to 
each of their (the Wilson's) children to buy automobiles" (Tr. 52) . 
Nowhere in the record is there evidence to show that these 
gifts were made to both David and Elizabeth by his parents. To the 
contrary, affidavits filed by David's parents during the initial 
proceedings reflect neither had any intent to make any of these 
gifts to anyone but David alone (R. 18-21) 
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In spite of the evidence presented by David and the lack of 
evidence from Elizabeth in support of her position that this was 
in some way marital property the trial court arbitrarily without 
credible evidence or legal authority simply characterized these 
gifts as marital property and divided them equally between the 
parties. Such an approach is devoid of fairness and equity and is 
simply an incorrect legal analysis of the facts and a clear 
misunderstanding of the law. 
A similar error in approach was committed in connection with 
the handling of the $7,000.00 loan made by David's father to assist 
him in buying the house (Tr. 712) . The evidence was that the total 
$27,000.00 given by David's parents was made in the form of two 
payments; the first, $20,000.00 which was an advance on David's 
inheritance (Tr. 713) and the second, $7,000.00 which was a loan 
from David's father to David (Tr. 712). Elizabeth provided no 
testimony to contradict this other than that she felt that the 
total $27,000.00 was a gift to both of them (Tr. 768-769). 
In spite of that evidence the trial court chose the simple but 
erroneous solution that such a HBAn was unenforceable and only a 
"moral" obligation (Tr. 870) . 
In taking the approach it did, by "just dividing everything 
down the center, totalling everything they had and dividing it down 
the center" (Tr. 870) (Except for the $7,000.00 owed to David's 
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father) the trial court was able to avoid having to allocate assets 
between the parties, and take a relatively easy but incorrect way 
out. 
That portion of the Decree that gives David no credit for the 
gifts he received from his parents should be vacated and the matter 
remanded with instructions to the trial court to increase David's 
lien in the marital residence to the extent of any such gifts. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING DEFENDANT 
TO PAY& 5,000 TOWARDS PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S 
FEES ^ 
An award of attorney's fees in divorce actions in Utah is 
authorized by the provisions of Section 30-3-3 Utah Code Anno, 
(1953) which states in relevant part: 
The court may order either party to pay to the 
Clerk a sum of money to enable each party to 
prosecute or defend the action 
Id. 
The foundational case in Utah which has interpreted and applied 
that statute and upon which subsequent cases from the Utah Supreme 
Court and this Court are based is the case of Kerr v. Kerr, 610 
P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980), in addressing the adequacy of the attorney's 
fee awarded, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
. . . pursuant to statute [footnote] A court 
in a divorce proceeding is empowered to award 
such sums as will permit the opposing party to 
bring or defend the action. The decision to 
make such an award, together with the amount 
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thereof, rests primarily witinh the sound 
discretion of the Court. [footnote] As with 
the award of alimony, however, an award of 
attorney's fees must rest on the basis of need 
[footnote] and reasonableness" 
In fact, under Utah law, there are three elements which must 
be satisfied and proven by the party seeking an award of attorney's 
fees; those are: (1) the reasonableness of the fee; (2) the need 
of the party seeking the fee award to have her fee paid or 
contributed to; and (3) the ability of the party against whom the 
award is made to pay or contribute towards a fee. 
As was stated in Ghost v. Ghost, 26 Utah 2d 398, 490 P. 2d 339 
(1971), the trial court not only had to consider the reasonableness 
of the fee requested and the need of the party seeking the fee, but 
also what amount the party having to pay the fee could reasonably 
pay. Id. at 340. 
In this case, the first two of those elements are not being 
challenged by David. With regard to the element of reasonableness, 
it is undisputed that this was a lengthy, extensive and expensive 
custody trial. Elizabeth's attorney's fee was approximately 
$11,000.00, together with costs of over $1,379.05 (R. 161-169). 
David expended attorney's fees through trial of over $11,3 03.50, 
together with the costs of $3,525.00 (R. 170-174). Both sides 
presented their evidence as to fees in somewhat of an unorthodox 
manner after each had rested and by way of Affidavit and without 
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stipulation. However, for purposes of this appeal, the element of 
reasonableness is not challenged. 
The second element is the need of the person requesting the 
award of fees. In this case, it is clear that neither party has 
significant income and each was attempting to meet minimum monthly 
expenses as best they could. Even though Elizabeth did not testify 
that she requested an award of attorney's fees, and had need of an 
award and it is acknowledged by David that under the recent holding 
of Mauahn v. Mauahn, 770, P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989), this court 
can review the entire record and extract from it evidence which 
would demonstrate the need of the requesting party without the 
necessity of a specific statement being made by that party during 
her testimony. Id at 160. 
However, the award of attorney's fees in this case should fail 
because the third element, i.e., the ability of the party being 
ordered to pay the fees was not proven. David did not and does 
not have the ability to pay that obligation. 
In analyzing whether or not that element has been proven, two 
questions must be asked and answered. First, does David have 
sufficient income to allow him to pay the fee? Second, does David 
have sufficient property to which he can look in order to satisfy 
the fee obligation? The answer to both of these questions in this 
case is no. 
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With regard to the first question, after considering the 
obligations which have been imposed upon David in terms of on-going 
support, his monthly net disposable income after the payment of 
those obligations amounts to $584,75. From that amount, he will 
be required to pay rent on an apartment, feed, clothe and transport 
himself and care for the children's needs when they are with him 
under the very expanded visitation schedule awarded by the trial 
court. Simply and succinctly put, he has no discretionary income 
from which to pay an award of $5,000.00 in attorney's fees for his 
wife. 
In analyzing the second question as to whether or not he has 
property which would allow that fee to be satisfied, under the 
property distribution of the court, he has none, i.e., he was 
awarded a $13,500.00 lien in the marital residence, not payable 
until the happening of the standard contingencies and, therefore, 
non-liquid; one-half of the IRA account of $13,000 also not liquid 
without incurring substantial tax penalties for an early 
withdrawal; and $1,000.00 equity in a Ready Asset Account (liquid). 
After considering the fact that Elizabeth's disposable income 
is far greater than David's and the fact that David has no liquid 
assets from which to pay a fee and the further fact that even if 
those assets were liquid he would be required to invade the same, 
and thereby reduce a substantial portion of the value of the 
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property awarded to him and the final fact that he is obligated to 
pay his own attorney, the award of attorney'^ fees in this case 
was simply without merit, unjustified and most unfair and 
inequitable to David. As such, that award should be vacated and 
each side should be required to bear their own fees in connection 
with this action. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in awarding permanent alimony to 
Elizabeth. Each of the parties was approximately equal in terms 
of education and earning capacity. By making the award of alimony 
it did, the trial court erroneously attempted to maintain the 
wife's standard of living and by so doing, greatly reduced the 
husband's standard of living. In addition, the trial court's 
Findings were fatally defective in that they did not address the 
wife's ability to support herself or contain the necessary 
financial facts to support the alimony award. The alimony award 
should be vacated in its entirety. 
David's premarital property and the cash gifts given to David 
during the marriage from his parents were entirely and erroneously 
disregarded. In not returning to David his premarital property and 
giving David credit for the gifts he received from his parents, the 
trial court failed to follow the rule set down in Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, supra and, consequently, erred. David should be 
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restored his premarital property and he should be given credit for 
the gifts he received from his parents by increasing his lien in 
the marital residence to the extent of any such gifts. 
In making its award of attorney's fees, the trial court failed 
to consider the ability of David to pay those fees. After paying 
the support ordered, David's disposable income is far less than 
Elizabeth's. In addition, he was awarded no property to which he 
could look to satisfy the fee. As such, he did not have the 
ability to pay the fee and the attorney's fee award should be 
vacated in its entirety. 
Appellant would respectfully request that the relief requested 
as set forth in page 3 of this Brief be granted and that he be 
awarded his costs incurred in connection with this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of November 1989. 
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Third Judicial District 
MAR 6 1989 
SALT; LAKE CCfWTY ' 
Deputy ClerK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH A. WILSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. D-88-642 
This matter was tried before the Court during the week of 
January 12 through the 18, 1989, and closing arguments were heard 
on February 7, 1989. The plaintiff was present at all hearings, 
and represented by Judith Romney Wolbach. The defendant was 
present at all of the hearings, and represented by Lynn J. Clark. 
The Court heard testimony from the witnesses, admitted 
documentary evidence, heard oral argument and took the matter 
under advisement. The Court being fully advised in the premises 
now makes its ruling. 
The Court finds as follows: 
1. Plaintiff and defendant have three children as issue of 
this marriage: Isaiah, born July 2, 1982; Rachel, born May 28, 
1984; and Isaac, born June 15, 1985. 
2. Plaintiff has had custody of the children since the 
filing of the divorce action, February 26, 1988. 
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3. Plaintiff and the three minor children have resided in 
the home acquired by the parties during their marriage. 
4. Plaintiff and defendant are both loving and caring 
parents, and are genuinely interested in the welfare of their 
children. 
5. Plaintiff and defendant both have a good relationship 
with the children. 
6. Plaintiff has been the primary caretaker of the 
children since birth. 
I. Plaintiff is more emotionally stable, better self-
controlled, more flexible in her thinking and approaches 
conflicts in a more rational manner. 
8. Plaintiff is a more forgiving and tolerant person. 
9. Defendant is stern in his approach to disciplining the 
children. 
10. Defendant is a rigid, unyielding and uncompromising 
individual who will not compromise on what he believes is right. 
II. Defendant is an authoritarian who sees things as only 
being black and white. 
12. Defendant wanted to dominate the lives of his wife and 
children. 
13. Defendant's dominance and control could cause the 
children to become rebellious when they reach their teens. 
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14. Defendant has created a situation where there is a 
great deal of acrimony between himself and the plaintiff, and as 
a result the parties should have minimum contact• 
15. The plaintiff is more likely to cultivate the 
children's love for their father than the father would for the 
mother. 
16. Defendant is prone to demean plaintiff in the presence 
of the children and minimize her role as mother and custodial 
parent. 
17. Defendant believes in a very strong, rigorous 
patriarchal role in his marriage and as a result the wife is to 
be submissive and passive. 
18. The testimony by the neighbors and friends about 
mismatched clothing, meals, and supervision indicated that both 
parents were wanting in parental skills. 
19. Defendant as well as plaintiff was responsible for the 
children's appearance, meals and supervision. 
20. Plaintiff's work schedule is better adapted for 
providing adequate day care for the children while she works. 
21. Defendant's work schedule is such that it would be 
difficult to provide stable and consistent supervision of the 
children while he is at work. 
WILSON V. WILSON PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court concludes for the reasons above stated that it is 
in the best interests of the children that they remain in the 
custody of their mother• 
The plaintiff exhibits more of the qualities that would 
allow the children to reach their physical and emotional 
potential, whereas the defendant is more apt to stifle the 
children's potential. 
The plaintiff provides a better role model for the children 
inasmuch as she recognizes that there is equality between husband 
and wife, mutual respect, and that neither is to be totally 
dominant over the other. 
The Court recognizes that the defendant has many fine 
attributes and will make every effort to do well by his children. 
However, his inability to be forgiving, unbending and somewhat 
vindictive are not attributes that should be instilled in 
children in today's society. 
The visitation schedule for the defendant is as follows: 
1. Alternating weekends from Friday after school through 
placing the children in school the following Monday. Such 
visitation would increase to include either the Thursday night 
Friday period or the Monday, Monday night period where a three 
day weekend from school is scheduled. 
2. One night each week from the time school is out until 
8:00 p.m. that evening. 
WILSON V. WILSON PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
3. Alternating major holidays, including January 1, 
President's Day, Easter Sunday, Memorial Day, July 4, July 24, 
Labor Day, and Veterans Day, Such visitations to begin the 
evening prior to the holiday and continue through the holiday 
until 8:00 p.m., except for the 4th and 24th of July on which 
occasions the children should spend the night with defendant and 
be returned home the next morning by 10:00 a.m. 
4. Father's Day, defendant's birthday, six hours on each 
of the children's birthdays. 
5. Alternating Thanksgivings beginning Wednesday evening 
at 6:00 p.m. and continuing through Sunday evening at 7:00 p.m. 
6. Alternating Christmas vacations wherein the children 
will spend Christmas Eve and until noon Christmas Day with one 
parent and the remainder of Christmas Day and the following five 
days with the other parent. Such arrangement to alternate on a 
year by year basis. 
7. Forty-five days of the summer vacation to begin no 
sooner than one week after school is out and to end no later than 
two weeks prior to school resuming. 
If either parent moves from the state of Utah, the non-
custodial parent should have the following visitation rights: 
1. Christmas Day and up to two weeks of holiday vacation 
from school, every other year. During alternate years, after 
Christmas Day, until the children's school recess ends. 
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2. Forty-five days each summer. This visitation would 
preferably begin between one week after school is out and two 
weeks before school begins in the fall. 
3. The Thanksgiving holiday, from Wednesday through 
Sunday. 
4. During the spring break or Easter holiday, to the 
extent that this does not interfere with the children's school. 
5. Other visitation where the children live, as agreed to 
by the parties. 
As per stipulation of the parties, the grandparents of the 
children shall have reasonable telephone access to the children, 
and the following visitation rights, regardless of where the 
parents reside: 
1. The paternal grandparents shall have the right to visit 
with the children one week each summer, or during a school 
recess. 
2. The maternal grandparents shall have the right to visit 
with the children one week each summer. 
3. The visitation with the respective grandparents shall 
be scheduled by March 1 of each year. 
Either party can petition the Court to review the visitation 
schedule when either party moves from the state of Utah. 
The plaintiff is awarded the following • real and personal 
property: 
WILSON V. WILSON PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1. The home located at 5496 Hews Place, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, subject to a lien in the sum of $13,900.00 in favor of the 
Defendant. The plaintiff shall pay the $13,900.00 to the 
defendant within 60 days after the occurrence of any one of the 
following events: 
(a) The plaintiff remarries or cohabits with the 
member of the opposite sex. 
(b) When the youngest child reaches its majority. 
(c) If the plaintiff moves and establishes another 
place of residence. 
2. One-half of the retirement account and one-half of the 
ready assets account. 
3. The sofa, high back chair and computer provided she pay 
defendant $600.00 for the computer. 
4. All other property as per stipulation. 
The defendant is awarded the following personal property: 
1. The Blazer subject to paying plaintiff $6,500.00 upon 
transferring the vehicle to defendant. 
2. The Ford pickup. 
3. One-half of the retirement account and one-half of the 
ready asset account. 
4. The sewing machine. 
5. All other property as per stipulation. 
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The defendant shall pay child support in accordance with the 
child support guidelines. 
The plaintiff shall be awarded the divorce. 
The defendant shall pay $250.00 as alimony to plaintiff. 
The defendant shall pay $5,000.00 to plaintiff for the 
attorney's fees and costs incurred by her. 
Plaintiff's counsel shall prepare the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree in conformance with this 
Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this & day of March, 1989. 
A. ( - 7 ) , •f-'fVL'-c4*C> 
.JOHW A. ROKICH 
PRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this £3 day of March, 1989: 
Judith Romney Wolbach 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 W. Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Lynn J, Clark 
Attorney for Defendant 
948 E. North Union Avenue, Suite 105 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
JUDITH ROiyiNEY WOLBACH (3534) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-6222 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH A. WILSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
. Civil No. D-88-642 
Judge John A. Rokich 
This matter was tried before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable 
John A. Rokich, District Court Judge, presiding, during the week of January 12 
through 11, 1989. Both parties were present throughout the trial. The 
parties were represented by their attorneys of record, Judith Rcmney Wolbach 
for the plaintiff, and Lynn J Clark for the defendant. During the course of 
the trial, witnesses testified, including both parties, other lay witnesses, 
and Dr. Elizabeth Stewart and Dr. Victor Cline. The Court received documents 
in evidence, including a custody evaluation prepared by Dr. Stewart pursuant 
to a court order, and a report written by Dr. Cline at the defendant's 
request. In addition, pursuant to stipulation of counsel, the Court viewed 
video tapes prepared by Dr. Cline. The trial was continued until February 7, 
1989, at which time the Court heard the final arguments of counsel. The Court 
then took the matter under advisement, requesting counsel for the plaintiff to 
submit an affidavit on plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs, together with 
By 
APR 2 6 1989 
Lc'Huiy Clerk 
information on any employment secured by the plaintiff after trial. The Court 
also requested counsel for the defendant to provide additional information on 
the defendant's medical insurance. The Court thereafter received the 
information requested, and also received additional information volunteered by 
defendant's counsel regarding the defendant's ability to earn additional 
income. The Court took the matter under advisement and prepared a Memorandum 
Decision, dated March 6, 1989. On April 18, 1989, a hearing was had on 
defendant's Request for Clarification of Minute Entry, Objections to Proposed 
Findings, Conclusions and Decree, and Motion to Reconsider Judgment and on the 
plaintiff's Motion for Amendment of Proposed Findings and Conclusions, during 
which hearing counsel for the plaintiff was directed to make certain changes 
in the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce. 
Counsel for the plaintiff having made said corrections, the Court, having 
been fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, makes and enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and 
had been such a resident for more than three months inmediately prior to 
commencement of this action. 
2. The parties are husband and wife, having married on June 27, 1981, 
in Jackson, State of Mississippi. 
3. The parties have irreconcilable differences which make continuation 
of their marriage impossible. 
4. Three children have been born to the parties as issue of their 
marriage: Isaiah Wilson, born July 2, 1982; Rachel Wilson, born May 28, 1984; 
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and Isaac Wilson, born June 15, 1985. 
5. The plaintiff has had custody of these minor children since the 
filing of the divorce action, February 26, 1988. 
6. The plaintiff and the three minor children have been residing in the 
home acquired by the parties during their marriage, a house and lot located at 
5496 South Hews Place, Kearns, Utah 84118. 
7. The custody of these children has been in issue throughout the 
pendency of this action. 
8. Both parties are loving and caring parents, are genuinely interested 
in the welfare of their children, and have good relationships with the 
children. 
9. This Court finds that custody of the parties children should be 
awarded to the plaintiff for the following reasons and supporting facts: 
(a) The plaintiff has been the primary caretaker of the children since 
their births. 
(b) The plaintiff is more emotionally stable, better self-controlled, 
more flexible in her thinking, and approaches conflicts in a more rational 
manner than the defendant. 
(c) The plaintiff is a more forgiving and tolerant person than the 
defendant. 
(d) The defendant is stern in his approach to disciplining the 
children. 
(e) The defendant is a rigid, unyielding, and uncompromising 
individual, who will not compromise on what he believes is right. 
(f) The defendant is an authoritarian, who sees things as only being 
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black and white. 
(g) The defendant has wanted to dominate the lives of the plaintiff and 
the children. 
(h) The defendant's expression of his need for dominance and control 
could cause the children to become rebellious when they reach their teens. 
(i) Hie acrimony existing between the parties requires that they have 
minimal contact with one another. 
(j) The plaintiff is more likely to cultivate the children's love for 
their father, the defendant, than he would for their mother, the plaintiff. 
(k) The defendant is prone to demean the plaintiff in the presence of 
the children and to minimize her role as mother and (custodial parent. 
(1) The defendant believes in a very strong, rigorous patriarchial role 
for the husband in a marriage, and he believes that a wife should be 
submissive and passive. 
(m) The testimony by the neighbors and friends about mismatched 
clothing, meals, and supervision indicated that both parents were wanting in 
parental skills. 
(n) Both parties were responsible for the children's appearance, meals, 
and supervision. 
(o) Upon Dr. Elizabeth's suggestion, the plaintiff took a parenting 
class during the pendency of this action, and upgraded her parenting skills. 
(p) The plaintiff's work schedule is better adapted than that of the 
defendant for providing adequate day care for the children. 
(q) Hie defendant's work schedule is such that it would be difficult to 
provide stable and consistent supervision of the children while he is at work. 
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10. This Court finds, for the reasons above stated: 
(a) That it is in the best interests of the children of the parties 
that they remain in the custody of their mother/ the plaintiff; 
(b) That the plaintiff exhibits more of the qualities that would allow 
the children to reach their physical and emotional potential, whereas the 
defendant is more apt to stifle the children's potential; 
(c) That the plaintiff provides a better role model for the children 
than does the defendant, because she recognizes that there is equality between 
husband and wife, that there should be mutual respect/ and that neither is to 
be totally dominant over the other; and/ 
(d) That although the defendant has many fine attributes and will make 
every effort to do well by his children/ his inability to be forgiving/ and 
his unbending and somewhat vindictive traits / are not attributes that should 
be instilled in children in today's society. 
11. It is fair and reasonable that the defendant should be awarded 
visitation as follows: 
(a) Every other weekend/ from Friday after school until Monday morning 
in time for the children's school. The children should be picked up and 
returned to their school or day care facility by the defendant. This weekend 
visitation would increase to include either the Thursday night-Friday period 
or the Monday-Monday night period where a three-day weekend holiday from 
school is scheduled; 
(b) CXie night each week, as agreed to by the parties, from the time 
school is out until 8:00 p.m.; 
(c) Alternating major holidays, including January 1, President's Day, 
-5-
Easter Sunday, Memorial Day, July 4, July 24, Labor Day and Veterans Day. Such 
visitation shall begin the evening prior to the holiday and shall continue 
through the holiday until 8;00 p.m., except for July 4 and July 24, on which 
occasions the children should remain with the defendant through the night of 
the holiday, to be taken to their school the next morning; 
(d) Fathers' Day, defendant's birthday, and six hours on the children's 
birthdays; 
(e) Alternating Thanksgivings, beginning Wednesday evening and 
continuing through Sunday evening at 8:00 p.m.; 
(f) Alternating Christmas vacations wherein the children will spend 
Christmas Eve until Christmas Day at noon with one parent and the remainder 
of Christmas Day and the following five days with the other parent. This 
arrangement will alternate on a year-by-year basis; and, 
(g) Forty-five days of the sumner vacation, to begin no sooner than one 
week after school is out and to end no later than two weeks prior to school 
resuming. 
12. If either parent moves from the State of Utah, it is fair and 
reasonable that the defendant should have the following visitation: 
(a) Christmas Day and up to twD weeks of the holiday recess from 
school, every other year, and in alternating years, frcm the day after 
Christmas until the end of the children's school recess; 
(b) Forty-five days each summer, preferably to begin one week after 
school is out and two weeks before school begins in the autumn; 
(c) The Thanksgiving holiday, from Wednesday thrpough Sunday; 
(d) Additional visitation during the spring break or Easter recess, to 
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the extent that this does not interfere with the children's school. 
(e) Additional visitation in the city where the children are residing 
with the plaintiff/ as agreed to by the parties. 
13. The parties have stipulated/ and it is reasonable/ that the 
grandparents should have visitation with the children/ as follows: 
(a) By both the paternal and the maternal grandparents/ reasonable 
telephone access to the children; 
(b) By the paternal grandparents/ one week each sunmer, or during a 
school recess; and/ 
(c) By the maternal grandparents, one week each summer/ or during a 
school recess. 
14. Visitation by grandparents should be arranged by March 1 each year. 
It is in the children's best interests that visitation by the defendant or by 
grandparents should not be allowed to interfere with the children's school. 
15. It is reasonable that either party may petition the Court to review 
the visitation schedule when either party moves from the State of Utah. 
16. Hie defendant is employed as a bus driver for Granite School 
District and as a part-time chaplain for the Utah State Prison. The defendant 
receives an annual director's fee of $2/000.00 from Wilson Land Development 
Co., a business founded by his father. His gross monthly income from these 
three sources is $1/747.00. 
17. The plaintiff was not employed outside the heme during the 
marriage. The plaintiff was not employed outside the hone at the time of the 
divorce. She obtained enployment as a receptionist prior to the ruling entered 
herein. She is now earning $960.00 a month, gross. 
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18. During the time the parties moved to the State of Utah until their 
separation/ they received/ in the form of contributions to the church they 
held in their home/ $150.00 a month from the defendant's parents and $350.00 a 
month from the plaintiff's parents. 
19. The defendant's cost for the medical insurance he is providing for 
the children is $54.00 a month. 
20. Pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines now in effect/ the 
defendant's child support obligation is $354.00 a month. 
21. The children are enrolled full-time in a Montessori School. This 
Court finds that it is in the best interests of the children to continue in 
this program, on the basis of the testimony and written reports of both Dr. 
Stewart and Dr. Cline# showing their need for a structured environment. 
22. The present cost of the children's day care only (exclusive of 
tuition) is $325.00. 
23. Pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines now in effect/ the 
defendant's share of the cost of day care is $211.25 a month. 
24 o The defendant has Blue Cross/Blue Shield family insurance through 
his employment with Granite School District. The additional cost for coverage 
for the children is $54.00 a month/ as above indicated. It is reasonable that 
he should be ordered to continue to provide this insurance for the children. 
It is also reasonable that each party should bear half of all medical/ dental, 
orthodontic/ and eye-care expenses that are not covered by insurance. 
25o The defendant has no insurance on his life at present. 
26. Based on the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during their 
marriage/ the incomes of the parties/ the needs of the plaintiff, and the 
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defendant's ability to pay, it is reasonable, just/ and equitable that the 
defendant should be ordered to pay alimony in the amount of $250.00 a month. 
Said alimony shall terminate upon the plaintiff's remarriage/ cohabitation 
with a member of the opposite sex, or death. 
27. It is reasonable that all payments by the defendant for child 
support/ day care, and alimony be paid in two equal installments on the 5th 
and 20th day of each month/ carmencing April 1/ 1989. 
28. If the defendant is thirty days or more in arrears in his total 
child support and alimony obligation for one month/ a Withhold and Deliver 
Order may be issued. 
29. The marital estate of the parties consists of the following: 
(a) The parties' marital residence, a house and lot situated at 5496 
South/ Reams, Utah 84118/ with an equity of $28/800.00; 
(b) A 1987 Blazer, presently operated by the plaintiff, with a value of 
$13/000.00; 
(c) A 1979 pickup truck/ presently operated by the defendant, with a 
value of $1,000.00; 
(d) Household furniture with a nominal value; 
(e) A computer, which was given to the plaintiff by the defendant after 
the parties' separation; 
(f) Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account #56623210/ the balance of which, 
according to the defendant's Financial Declaration was $1,994.59 on Septennber 
7, 1989, and the present value of which is unknown; 
(g) Merrill Lynch I.R.A. Account #566-46206, the balance of which, 
according to the defendant's Financial Declaration was $13,945.00 on January 
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1/ 1988/ and the present value of which is unknown; and/ 
(h) A deferred income account with Granite School District/ into which 
the defendant has made payments of $12.55 a month for approximately one year. 
30. The marital residence was purchased in December of 1985 and title 
thereto was put in the names of both parties. The parties received a gift of 
$20/000.00 from the defendant's parents for the purchase of this property. In 
addition/ the defendant's parents loaned $7/000.00/ with no interest and with 
no required payments thereon/ to the defendant to assist in purchasing this 
property. This loan is not secured and is not evidenced in writing and is not 
enforceable against the parties. 
31. The balance due on the house and lot is $26/161.00. The fair market 
value/ as stipulated to by the parties is $54/850.00. The monthly payments are 
$354.00. The equity of the parties is $28/800.00. 
32. The parties stipulated/ during the trial/ that the party who was 
awarded custody of the children would be awarded this property. This Court 
approves that stipulation and finds that it is just and equitable that the 
house and lot be awarded to the plaintiff, subject to her assuming and paying 
the first mortgage thereon; that the defendant quit-claim his interest therein 
to the plaintiff; and that the defendant be awarded an equitable lien on said 
property in the amount of $13/900.00/ representing his share of the equity 
reduced by half of the estimated costs of sale. 
33. It is reasonable that the plaintiff should be required to pay the 
defendant's $13/900.00 lien within 60 days after the occurence of any one of 
the following: 
(a) The plaintiff remarries or cohabits with a member of the opposite 
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sex; 
(b) The youngest child reaches his majority; or, 
(c) The plaintiff moves and establishes another place of residence. 
34. The parties own a 1987 Blazer subject to a balance thereon of 
approximately $4,000.00. The monthly payments are $97.00 a month, which have 
been paid by the plaintiff since the separation of the parties. The parties 
traded in a truck, used funds from their Ready Asset account, and applied a 
cash gift from defendant's parents for the down payment on this vehicle. 
35. It is reasonable, just, and equitable that the 1987 Blazer be 
awarded to the defendant and that he pay to the plaintiff the sum of $6,500.00 
for her interest therein and to enable her to purchase an automobile for her 
own use. This payment shall be made to the plaintiff when she turns over the 
Blazer to the defendant. 
36. It is reasonable, just, and equitable that the truck be awarded to 
the defendant and that he pay to the plaintiff the sum of $500.00 for her 
interest therein. 
37. Shortly before the parties1 marriage, the defendant sold real 
property which he had previously received as a gift from his parties and 
deposited the proceeds of sale, $37,500.00, in the Merrill Lynch Ready Asset 
Account. 
38. The parties received a wedding gift from the defendant's parents in 
the amount of $8,000.00. From this sum, tithing was paid in the amount of 
$5,000.00 for gifts received from defendant's parents (including that referred 
to in the preceding paragraph), and deposited the remainder in the Merrill 
Lynch Ready Asset Account. As described in this paragraph, the gift of 
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$37/500.00 and the wedding gift of $8/000.00 were ccniingled. 
39. The parties used funds from said account to meet their living 
expenses. In addition/ $10/000.00 was withdrawn from said account and 
deposited in a Merrill Lynch I.R.A. account/ the parties1 only retirenent 
account. 
40. In order to determine the value the Merrill Lynch Ready Asset 
Account and the Merrill Lynch I.R.A. Account as of the date the Decree of 
Divorce is entered/ it will be necessary for the defendant to produce 
documentary verification of said values as of the date of entry. Said 
documentation should be provided to counsel for the plaintiff within 30 days 
of the date of entry of the Decree. 
41. The Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account and the Merrill Lynch I.R.A. 
accounts are both marital assets and it is reasonable/ just and equitable that 
their value should be divided equally between the parties. The defendant 
should be awarded both of these accounts and he should be ordered to pay to 
the plaintiff/ as her share of said accounts, half of the value of said 
accounts as shown on the books of Merrill Lynch as of the date of entry of the 
Decree of Divorce/ for which sum the plaintiff should be given judgment. 
42. It is reasonable, just and equitable that the defendant should be 
awarded his deferred interest account with the Granite School District, 
subject to no claim by the plaintiff. 
43. The parties have entered into a written stipulation, on file 
herein, for the division of most of their furniture, furnishings and 
appliances. It is reasonable, just and equitable that said property should be 
awarded pursuant to said stipulation. 
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44. With regard to the items on which the parties could not agree, it 
is reasonable^ just and equitable that the plaintiff should be awarded the 
sofa-bed/ the two high-back chairs and the computer, subject to her paying 
$600.00 to the defendant for his share in the latter; and it is reasonable, 
just and equitable that the defendant should be awarded the sewing machine. 
45. The attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff herein were in 
excess of $10,000.00. This Court finds that said attorney's fees were 
necessary and reasonable, but having taken into account the distribution of 
property herein, together with the fact that the plaintiff is now employed, 
determines that she should be given judgment for only $5,000.00 toward her 
legal expenses, which the defendant should be ordered to pay. 
46. Except as otherwise indicated herein, the parties have no marital 
debts. It is reasonable, just and equitable that each party should be ordered 
to pay all debts incurred by said party since the separation of the parties, 
except as otherwise herein indicated. 
47. It is reasonable, just and equitable that the parties should be 
ordered to execute and deliver all documents required to effect the Decree of 
Divorce. 
NOW, THEREFORE/ having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact/ 
the Court makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to, and the subject 
matter of/ this action. 
2. The plaintiff should be granted a Decree of Divorce, on the grounds 
of mental cruelty. 
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3. It is in the children's best interests that their custody be awarded 
to the plaintiff* 
4. The defendant's obligations to pay child support and a share of the 
children's day care should be calculated on the basis of the Child Support 
Schedule in effect at the time of the trial of this action. 
5. The plaintiff is entitled to an award of alimony. 
6. All properties acquired during the marriage of the parties comprise 
the marital estate. 
7. The division of marital property set forth in the preceding Findings 
of Fact allocates said property in the manner which best meets the needs of 
the parties, which permits them to pursue their separate lives, and which is 
in the best interests of the minor children of the parties. 
8. The $7/000.00 loan from the defendant's parents is unenforceable, 
and it would be inequitable to encumber the plaintiff's share of the marital 
estate with said loan or any part thereof. 
9. The Decree of Divorce should be in conformance with the foregoing 
Findings of Fact. 
DATED this d? £ day of April, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
district Court Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
On this (p day of April, 1989, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
a correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to 
Lynn J Clark, Attorney at Law, 948 East North Union Boulevard, Suite C-105, 
Midvale, Utah 84047. 
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JUDITH ROMNEY WOLBACH (3534) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-6222 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH A. WILSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




DECREE OF DIVORCE 
:
 Civil No. D-88-642 
Judge John A. Rokich 
This matter was tried before the above-entitled Court/ the Honorable 
John A. Rokich, District Court Judge/ presidingf during the week of January 12 
through 11, 1989. Both parties were present throughout the trial. The 
parties were represented by their attorneys of record/ Judith Rocnney Vfolbach 
for the plaintiff/ and Lynn J Clark for the defendant. During the course of 
the trial/ witnesses testified/ including both parties, other lay witnesses/ 
and Dr. Elizabeth Stewart and Dr. Victor Cline. The Court received documents 
in evidence, including a custody evaluation prepared by Dr. Stewart pursuant 
to a court order/ and a report written by Dr. Cline at the defendant's 
request. In addition, pursuant to stipulation of counsel, the Court viewed 
video tapes prepared by Dr. Cline. The trial was continued until February 1, 
1989/ at which time the Court heard the final arguments of counsel. The Court 
then took the matter under advisement/ requesting counsel for the plaintiff to 
submit an affidavit on plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs, together with 
information on any employment secured by the plaintiff after trial. The Court 
also requested counsel for the defendant to provide additional information on 
the defendant's medical insurance. The Court thereafter received the 
information requested/ and also received additional information volunteered by 
defendant's counsel regarding the defendant's ability to earn additional 
income. The Court took the matter under advisement and prepared a Memorandum 
Decision/ dated March 6, 1989. On April 18/ 1989, a hearing was had on 
defendant's Request for Clarification of Minute Entry/ Objections to Proposed 
Findings/ Conclusions and Decree and Motion to Reconsider Judgment/ and on the 
plaintiff's Motion for Amendment of Proposed Findings and Conclusions, during 
which hearing counsel for the plaintiff was directed to make certain changes 
in the proposed Findings of Fact/ Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce. 
Counsel for the plaintiff having made said corrections/ and the Court having 
made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, upon motion of 
counsel for the plaintiff, 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED/ DECREED/ AND ORDERED: 
1. The plaintiff is granted a divorce, terminating the marriage of the 
parties, to become final and absolute upon entry by the Clerk of the Court. 
2. The plaintiff is awarded care, custody, and control of the parties' 
minor children, Isaiah, Rachel, and Isaac. 
3. The defendant is awarded visitation as follows: 
(a) Every other weekend, from Friday after school until Monday morning 
in time for the children's school. The children shall be picked up and 
returned to their school or day care facility by the defendant. This weekend 
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visitation shall increase to include either the Thursday night-Friday period 
or the Monday-Monday night period where a three-day weekend holiday frcm 
school is scheduled; 
(b) One night each week, as agreed to by the parties, from the time 
school is out until 8:00 p.m.; 
(c) Alternating major holidays, including January 1, President's Day, 
Easter Sunday, Manorial Day, July 4, July 24, Labor Day and Veterans Day. Such 
visitation shall begin the evening prior to the holiday and shall continue 
through the holiday until 8:00 p.m., except for July 4 and July 24, on which 
occasions the children will remain with the defendant through the night of the 
holiday, to be taken to their school by him the next morning; 
(d) Fathers' Day, defendant's birthday, and six hours on the children's 
birthdays; 
(e) Alternating Thanksgivings, beginning Wednesday evening and 
continuing through Sunday evening at 8:00 p.m.; 
(f) Alternating Christmas vacations wherein the children will spend 
Christmas Eve until Christmas Day at noon with one parent, and the remainder 
of Christmas Day and the following five days with the other parent. This 
arrangement will alternate on a year-by-year basis; and, 
(g) Forty-five days of the sunmer vacation, to begin no sooner than one 
week after school is out and to end no later than two weeks prior to school 
resuming. 
4. If either parent moves from the State of Utah, the defendant shall 
have the following visitation: 
(a) Christmas Day and up to two weeks of the holiday recess frcm 
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school, every other year, and in alternating years, from the day after 
Christmas until the end of the children's school recess; 
(b) Forty-five days each sunnier, preferably to begin one week after 
school is out and ending no later than two weeks before school begins in the 
autumn; 
(c) The Thanksgiving holiday, from Wednesday through Sunday; 
(d) Additional visitation during the spring break or Easter recess, to 
the extent that this does not interfere with the children's school. 
(e) Additional visitation in the city where the children are residing 
with the plaintiff, as agreed to by the parties. 
5. The paternal and the maternal grandparents shall have visitation 
with the children, as follows: 
(a) By both the paternal and the maternal grandparents, reasonable 
telephone access to the children; 
(b) By the paternal grandparents, one week each sumner, or during a 
school recess; and, 
(c) By the maternal grandparents, one week each summer, or during a 
school recess. 
6. Visitation by grandparents shall be arranged by March 1 each year. 
Visitation by the defendant or by grandparents shall not be allowed to 
interfere with the children's school. 
7. Either party may petition the Court to review the visitation 
schedule when either party moves from the State of Utah. 
8. The defendant is ordered to pay child support in the amount of 
$354.00 a month. 
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9. The defendant is ordered to pay $211.25 a month to the plaintiff as 
his share of the day-care expense for the children. 
10. The defendant is ordered to continue to provide Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield insurance coverage for the children through his employment. Each party 
is ordered to pay half of all medical/ dental/ orthodontic/ and eye-care 
expenses that are not covered by insurance. 
11. The defendant is ordered to pay alimony in the amount of $250.00 a 
month. Said alimony shall terminate upon the plaintiff's remarriage/ 
cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex, or death. 
12. All payments by the defendant for child support/ day caref and 
alimony shall be paid in two equal installments on the 5th and 20th day of 
each month/ axtmencing April 1/ 1989. 
13. If the defendant is thirty days or more in arrears in an amount 
equal to his total child support and alimony obligation for one month/ a 
Withhold and Deliver Order may be issued. 
14. Hie house and lot situated at 5496 Hews Place/ Kearns/ Utah 84118/ 
more particularly described as 
Lot 51/ HEW-WOOD ESTATES/ No. 2, County 
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, according 
to the official plat thereof 
is awarded to the plaintiff/ subject to her assuming and paying the first 
mortgage thereon, and the defendant is ordered to quit-claim his interest 
therein to the plaintiff. 
15. The defendant is awarded an equitable lien on said property in the 
amount of $13/900.00/ payable within 60 days after the occurence of any one of 
the following: 
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(a) The plaintiff remarries or cohabits with a member of the opposite 
sex; 
(b) The youngest child reaches his majority; or, 
(c) Hie plaintiff moves and establishes another place of residence. 
16. The 1987 Blazer is awarded to the defendant, subject to the 
obligation thereon, holding the plaintiff harmless therefor; and he is ordered 
to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $6,500.00 for her interest therein, and to 
enable her to purchase an automobile, when she turns over the Blazer to him. 
17. The truck is awarded to the defendant and he is ordered to pay to 
the plaintiff the sum of $500.00 for her interest therein, for which sum she 
is given judgment. 
18. The defendant is awarded Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account 
#56623210 and Merrill Lynch I.R.A. Account #566-46206, and the plaintiff is 
given judgment for one half of the total value of these two accounts as of the 
date of this Decree. 
19. The defendant is ordered to provide to plaintiff's counsel, within 
thirty days of the date of this Decree, statements or other sufficient 
validation from Merrill Lynch establishing the value of the above-described 
accounts as of the date of this Decree. 
20. The defendant is awarded his deferred income account with the 
Granite School District, subject to no claim by the plaintiff. 
21. Except as otherwise set forth herein, the furniture, furnishings, 
and appliances of the parties are awarded pursuant to their stipulation, on 
file herein. 
22. The plaintiff is awarded the sofa-bed, the two high-back chairs and 
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the computer, subject to her paying $600.00 to the defendant for his share in 
the latter; and the defendant is awarded the sewing machine. 
23. The plaintiff is given judgment for $5,000.00 toward her attorney's 
fees, which the defendant is ordered to pay. 
24. Each party is ordered to pay all debts incurred by said party since 
the separation of the parties, except as otherwise herein indicated. 
25. The parties are ordered to execute arid deliver all documents 
required to effect the provisions set forth herein. 
DATED this rfib day of April, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
iLTS 
ILE JOHN A. ROKICH 
let Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
On this day of April, 1989, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
a correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to Lynn J Clark, Attorney at 
Law, 948 East North Union Boulevard, Suite C-105, Midvale, Utah 84047. 
